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Abstract
Continual data collection and widespread deployment of machine learning algorithms, par-
ticularly the distributed variants, have raised new privacy challenges. In a distributed machine
learning scenario, the dataset is stored among several machines and they solve a distributed
optimization problem to collectively learn the underlying model. We present a secure multi-
party computation inspired privacy preserving distributed algorithm for optimizing a convex
function consisting of several possibly non-convex functions. Each individual objective function
is privately stored with an agent while the agents communicate model parameters with neighbor
machines connected in a network. We show that our algorithm can correctly optimize the over-
all objective function and learn the underlying model accurately. We further prove that under
a vertex connectivity condition on the topology, our algorithm preserves privacy of individual
objective functions. We establish limits on the what a coalition of adversaries can learn by
observing the messages and states shared over a network.
Keywords – Distributed optimization, privacy preservation, distributed learning, networks.
1 Introduction
Advances in fast machine learning algorithms have resulted in widespread deployment of machine
learning algorithms [1]. Distributed learning and inference have become popular due to their inher-
ent efficiency, scalability, robustness and geo-distributed nature of datasets [2–8]. Distributed learn-
ing reduces communication requirements of learning, since machines communicate/share updates
(gradients or states) that are much smaller in size than datasets. Several distributed optimization
algorithms have appeared in literature over the past decade [8–20]. Solutions to distributed opti-
mization of convex functions have been proposed for myriad scenarios involving directed graphs [15],
link failures and losses [21], asynchronous communication models [14, 16, 22], stochastic objective
functions [11,23,24], fault tolerance [25] and differential privacy [17].
Privacy has emerged to be one of the most critical challenges in machine learning [1, 26–29].
For instance, in the healthcare industry, hospitals/insurance providers use medical records to learn
∗This research is supported in part by National Science Foundation awards 1421918 and 1610543, and Toyota
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predictive models estimating individual risk towards certain diseases. Data driven learning on
DNA sequences and medical records, has allowed to predict individual predisposition to certain
life threatening ailments, based solely on genetic factors. The genomic data and medical records
are highly sensitive and need to be protected (they can be easily misused by malicious entities)
[30]. Personalized recommendation systems is another application in which privacy is important.
Specifically, predicting the next word a user will input (using language models trained on personal
typing history e.g. SwiftKey [31]) or recommending pictures/videos based on viewing history are
examples where sensitive personal preferences are used for training models, and may threaten
privacy [32]. Corporations use data based analytics to learn models for everything ranging from
product demand-supply schedules [33], pricing, to marketing/advertising strategies using consumer
data. Collaborative shipping and transportation of goods among sellers can be modeled as a
linear programming problem, where, participating sellers would want to protect privacy [34, 35].
Financial fraud detection, transaction authentication, stock prediction, and credit risk etc can be
learned from large financial databases available with banks and credit bureaus. Roboticists are
interested in looking at problems like coverage [36], rendezvous [37], search and tracking [38, 39],
herding [40] etc. that involve use of multiple, collaborative robots. Robots location, internal states
and observations may be extremely sensitive (based on the application) and one would ideally want
robots to cooperatively solve problems, without sharing any of these pieces of private information.
All of these critical machine learning applications utilize datasets that contain personal and often
times extremely sensitive information. In this report we address a fundamental question - “How
do we accurately learn underlying models without leaking any private information?”
Current privacy preserving methods can be broadly classified into cryptographic approaches
and non-cryptographic approaches [41]. Cryptographic approaches as the name suggests, use cryp-
tographic techniques and have been extensively studied in literature [35, 41–46]. Cryptography
based privacy preserving techniques typically provide better security, however, are computationally
expensive and inefficient [46]. Cryptographic methods are also vulnerable to attacks that involve
stealing of encryption keys [41].
Several types of non-cryptographic approaches have gained popularity in recent years. -
differential privacy is a popular probabilistic technique that involves use of randomized perturba-
tions. Differential privacy aims to maximize accuracy of the queries made to a statistical database
while minimizing the probability of information leakage [1,17,47,48]. Differential privacy methods
suffer from a fundamental trade-off between the accuracy of the solution and the privacy margin
(parameter ). Transformation techniques involve concocting a new problem via algebraic transfor-
mations such that the solution of the new problem is the same as the solution of the old problem.
This enables agents to conceal private problem data (of the original problem) effectively while the
quality of solution is preserved [41,42]. Scaling, translation, affine transformation and certain non-
linear transformations are some of the algebraic transformation techniques that have been used in
literature [41,42,49–51].
Lou et.al in [52] claim that unconstrained, synchronous, distributed optimization protocols are
generally not privacy preserving and that asynchronous updates and projection sets (constrained
optimization) can be used to introduced privacy. We, however, show in Example 1, that projection
sets do not provide privacy protection from adversaries1. We also conjecture, that if adversary can
additionally observe and keep track of state updates then asynchronous nature of algorithm may
not be effective in providing any additional privacy.
Problem structure or the learning system architecture can be further exploited to improve
1We show that, in a system implementing projected gradient descent protocol from [23] or [53], a strong adversary
is successful in uncovering private objective functions.
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privacy. Preliminary ideas on such strategies, viz. function partitioning (splitting) and function
sharing are reported in our previous report [53]. We also show that structured randomization of
gradient updates can improve privacy in client-server architecture (multiple parameter servers and
multiple clients) in our prior report [8]. In this report, we present the function sharing approach
to privacy preservation followed by convergence (correctness) and privacy results. The objective of
this work is to introduce and quantify privacy guarantees in distributed machine learning.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of the report are threefold.
1. We develop a privacy preserving distributed optimization algorithm using a function sharing
strategy. Our novel algorithm is easy to use and computationally inexpensive.
2. We present and rigorously prove that the algorithm accurately optimizes the objective func-
tion while ensuring privacy of individual objective functions.
3. The strategy presented here (and ideas in [53]), allows us to establish crafty privacy preserving
techniques, that exploit the structure of distributed learning architectures. We believe that
such methods are practical for introducing privacy in distributed learning.
1.2 Organization
Problem formulation, adversary model and privacy definitions are presented in Section 2. Our
privacy preserving distributed optimization protocol in presented and detailed in Section 3. Con-
vergence and privacy guarantees are presented and proved in Section 4. Simulation results are
presented in Section 5.
1.3 Notation
Let the set of agents (also referred to as nodes) be denoted by V and the number of agents be
|V| = S. We use the symbol “∼” to denote a directed communication link over which information
sharing can occur between agents, e.g., I ∼ G denotes a directed communication link from agent
I to agent G. We define edge set as the set of all directed communication links E = {(u, v) : u ∈
V, v ∈ V and u ∼ v}. We consider bidirected communication links, hence, edge (v, u) ∈ E whenever
edge (u, v) ∈ E . Communicating links between agents induce a graph G = (V, E), defined by the
set of all nodes (agents), V and the set of all edges (communication links), E . The neighborhood
set of agent J , the set of all agents that communicate with agent J , is denoted by NJ . ‖.‖ denotes
Euclidean norm for vectors.
Every agent maintains an estimate of the model parameter vector (also referred to as iterate).
Iterate stored in agent I at iteration k is denoted by xIk, where the superscript denotes the agent-id,
the subscript denotes the time index. The average of iterates at time instant k is denoted by x¯k
and the disagreement of an iterate (xJk ) with the iterate average (x¯k) by δ
J
k .
x¯k =
1
S
S∑
J=1
xJk , δ
J
k = x
J
k − x¯k. (1)
Agents also maintain an estimate of iterate average denoted by vJk , where the superscript represents
the agent-id and the subscript denotes the iteration index.
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2 Problem Formulation
We consider a distributed optimization problem involving S agents, each of whom has access to
a private, possibly non-convex objective function fi(x). Agents intend to collectively solve the
following optimization problem,
Find x∗ ∈ argmin
x∈X
f(x), (2)
where X is the feasible parameter set, and f(x) ,∑Si=1 fi(x) is a convex objective function. The
dimension of the problem (number of parameters in the decision vector, x) is denoted by D. We
enforce the following assumption on the functions fi(x) and on the feasible parameter set X .
Assumption 1 (Objective Function and Decision Set). The individual objective functions fi(x)
and the feasible parameter set X satisfy the following properties,
(A) The objective functions fi : RD → R, ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , S are potentially non-convex functions of
model parameter vector x. However, the sum of individual objective functions is necessarily
convex, i.e., f(x) :=
∑S
i=1 fi(x) is a convex function.
(B) The feasible parameter vector set, X , is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset of RD.
Following the above assumption, we will refer to the aggregate function, f(x), as a convex aggregate
of non-convex functions.
We further make a boundedness assumption on the gradient of individual function fi(x) followed
by an assumption on the Lipschitzness of gradients.
Assumption 2 (Gradient Boundedness and Lipschitzness). Let gh(x) denote the gradient of the
function fh(x). The gradients gh(x) satisfy,
(A) The gradients are norm bounded, i.e. there exist scalars L1, L2, . . . , LS such that, ‖gh(x)‖ ≤
Lh; ∀ h (= {1, 2, · · · , S}) and ∀ x ∈ X .
(B) Each function gradient (gh(x)) is assumed to be Lipschitz continuous i.e. there exist scalars
Nh > 0 such that, ‖gh(x) − gh(y)‖ ≤ Nh‖x − y‖ for all x 6= y (x, y ∈ X ) and ∀ h (=
{1, 2, . . . , S}).
Agents communicate with their neighbors and share model parameter estimates. The commu-
nication graph G constitutes bidirectional links. G is assumed to be a connected graph. All agents
are assumed to be synchronous and fault-free. All communication links are assumed to be reliable.
Throughout this report, we will use the following definitions and notation regarding the set of all
optima (X ∗) and the function value at optima (f∗),
f∗ = inf
x∈X
f(x), X ∗ = {x ∈ X |f(x) = f∗}, dist(x,X ∗) = inf
x∗∈X ∗
‖x− x∗‖.
The optimal function value, at the solution of the optimization problem or the minimizing state
vector is denoted by x∗, is denoted by f∗.
2.1 Adversary Model
Various adversary models have been studied and employed in literature and they are broadly
classified, as follows, based on the capabilities and intentions of the adversary:
• Passive Adversary [44] - Passive adversaries limit the interaction to eavesdropping on their own
communication channels and storing evolution of observed states and other information. Passive
adversaries follow default protocol as other “good” participants2.
2An agent that is not an adversary is referred to as “good” agent.
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• Active Adversary (Byzantine Adversary [44, 54]) - Active adversary model empowers the adver-
sary to send, tamper and delete parts of messages being exchanged. They may arbitrarily deviate
from the default protocol.
• Curious Adversary - Curious adversaries try to uncover private information of the system (e.g.
individual objective functions fi(x)) using information available with them.
• Bounded Rationality - Bounded rationality adversaries have limited computational power and
they cannot perform complex computations. Conversely, unbounded rationality models have
also been proposed and there exist strategies like Shamir’s secret sharing mechanism [55] that
are secure against adversaries with unbounded rationality (information theoretic security).
In this report, we model the adversary as Passive-Curious (PC) entity3. An adversary (denoted
by A) is PC, if it records the evolution of the system states by eavesdropping and tries to uncover
information that is private to other agents. We consider a very strong adversary in the sense that
the adversary has access to a lot of information about the system, which is typically unavailable
in a distributed setting. A strong adversary makes privacy preservation difficult and underlines
the strength of our approach. Note that we consider privacy in synchronous setting and it further
shows the competence of our approach4. The assumption of a strong and motivated adversary with
complete knowledge of the system (states and the underlying network) is essential to ensure that
we perform vulnerability analysis in the worst scenario, following Kerckhoffs’s principle.
Adversary has access to all the states of the system (model parameters xIk of all agents I at
all time instants k) and its own private objective function. It also has access to all incoming
and outgoing secure communications from itself. The adversary also has an understanding of the
network structure and topology. The adversary, being passive, is restricted to following the same
distributed optimization protocol as other “good” agents5. The adversary, although curious, wants
the system to correctly solve the optimization problem.
An alliance of cooperating adversaries is called a coalition (denoted by A). In this report we also
show privacy guarantees against a coalition of f PC adversaries (|A| = f). Information available
to any adversary A ∈ A, is shared instantaneously among the other coalition members. Hence, any
adversary A can observe the evolution of all states, the network topology and any communication
that is inbound and outbound from any of the adversaries.
2.2 Privacy Definitions
We define privacy as the inability of the adversary to uncover private objective functions. Dis-
tributed optimization protocols involve agents utilizing its own local gradients to perform state
updates followed by sharing the state estimate with neighbors. Since, a PC adversary has access
to both the states and the network topology, under distributed gradient descent protocols [23], a
PC adversary can estimate states and local gradients at these states. An adversary, by employing
numerical techniques like polynomial regression (polynomial interpolation, numerical integration
etc.) on the history of state and gradients pair (x,∇fi(x)), can estimate gradients of private ob-
jective functions private to agents. This does not exactly provide fi(x), since ∇fi(x) is available
only at discrete state values (and not known analytically) and there will be integration constants
3For the purposes of this report, we will assume that all adversaries are strong PC adversaries.
4Privacy in synchronous executions is relatively challenging as compared to asynchronous executions [56]. This
follows from the fact that in asynchronous executions the step sizes (and the update counts) are uncoordinated and
it makes estimating gradients form the observed states difficult.
5Agent I(∈ V) is “good” agent if I∈A.
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that cannot be resolved. However, an adversary can guess with good accuracy the form (shape)
and general behavior of a private function.
In this report we attempt to solve a more demanding privacy problem. If we assume that
an adversary can in fact estimate the gradients accurately, it is easy to see that the adversary
can uncover private objective functions. We provide a scheme that ensures that no adversary can
guess the individual objective functions with any accuracy. Formally we first define the set of all
admissible private objective functions fi(x) as,
Definition 1 (Admissible Function Set). The set of all possible objective functions fi(x) is called
the admissible function set and is denoted by F .
Let FS denote the set of S private objective functions (each associated to one of the S agents
and each belonging to set F). Hence, FS = {(f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fS(x))}, where fi(x) ∈ F for
i = {1, 2, . . . , S}.
Following the definition of admissible function set, we use the inability of the adversary to ac-
curately guess the function from set FS as the basis for defining privacy. Formally, an optimization
protocol is called privacy preserving if it satisfies the following definition of privacy.
Definition 2 (Privacy). An optimization algorithm is said to be privacy preserving under a given
adversary model, if the information observed by the adversaries is compatible with any set of
functions i.e. any element of FS (e.g. (h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hS(x)) ∈ FS), such that the sum of its
functions is original aggregate function f(x), i.e. f(x) =
∑S
i=1 hi(x).
Intuitively, we define privacy as the inability of a PC adversary (or a coalition) to reduce the
ambiguity associated with any guessed objective function. In other words, even after observing the
execution of the optimization protocol (states, gradients etc.), an adversary (or a coalition) finds
any arbitrarily guessed candidate functions (belonging to FS and such that its functions add up to
original f(x)) to be equally likely of being the true objective function.
A Motivating Example
In the following example we show that, in a standard distributed optimization problem being solved
by a distributed protocol, a strong PC adversary can guess private objective functions merely by
observing the state evolution.
Example 1. Let us consider a distributed optimization problem over a network with three nodes
in a fully connected topology (Figure 1a). The private objective functions for each of the nodes are
f1(x) = (x−1)2, f2(x) = (x−2)2 +(x−2)4 and f3(x) = (x−3)4. The system of agents tries to find
an optima of f(x) = f1(x)+f2(x)+f3(x) using distributed optimization protocol (for deterministic
objective functions) from [53] or [23]. Agent 1 is a strong PC adversary (as shown in Figure 1a with
two concentric circles in blue) with private objective function f1(x). The adversary has complete
knowledge of state evolution of all states (x1k, x
2
k, x
3
k) and the network connectivity. Agent 1 can
estimate both (x2k,∇f2(x2k)) and (x3k,∇f3(x3k)), since it is privy to the states, network structure
and step sizes. The adversary can estimate the gradient function using polynomial interpolation
or polynomial regression. Integrating the gradient provides the objective functions f2(x) and f3(x)
with an ambiguity of a constant term.
In this example we show a successful attack from a strong PC adversary. Distributed opti-
mization protocol from [53] is executed for 300 iterations. The system of agents correctly solves
the optimization problem. During the execution, adversary observes the state evolution and using
its knowledge of the protocol and the network structure, it estimates gradient values at discrete
iterates. Agent 1 uses least squares polynomial fitting (numpy.polyfit) to guess the gradient func-
tion based on estimated gradient and iterate pairs. This gradient function is further integrated to
6
obtain the objective function. In this attack, the functions guessed by the adversary are tabulated
in Table 1. The adversary is successful in uncovering objective functions f2(x) and f3(x) (with an
ambiguity in the constant term).
Problem 1
fi(x) True Obj. Function, fi(x) Estimated Obj. Function, f˜i(x) Ambiguity
f1(x) x
2 − 2x+ 1 Known to Adversary -
f2(x) x
4 − 8x3 + 25x2 − 36x+ 20 x4 − 8x3 + 25x2 − 36x+ C2 C2
f3(x) x
4 − 12x3 + 54x2 − 108x+ 81 x4 − 12x3 + 54x2 − 108x+ C3 C3
Table 1: An example showing successful attack by a PC adversary.
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(a) Adversary (Agent 1) is shown with two concen-
tric circles (blue).
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(d) Least squares polynomial fit for ∇f3(x).
Figure 1: An example demonstrating a successful attack by a strong PC adversary and the subse-
quent privacy loss in distributed optimization.
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3 Privacy Preserving Distributed Optimization Algorithm
We present privacy preserving distributed optimization algorithm inspired by secure multiparty
aggregation algorithm in [27]. We present a two step protocol. In the first step we perform a secure
exchange of arbitrarily generated functions and then use these functions to transform the private
objective functions. The second step involves an interleaved consensus and projected gradient
algorithm [53]. Our algorithm, differs from popular distributed gradient descent protocols, in the
sense that it involves the objective function being transformed enabling us to provide privacy
guarantees. The convergence analysis used here (presented in [53]) is also novel in the sense that
it proves convergence of a distributed projected gradient descent algorithm for a convex aggregate
of non-convex functions.
Each agent is endowed with a private objective function fi(x). Now consider that each agent,
I, arbitrarily generates functions RI,J(x) corresponding to each of its neighbors (J ∈ NI). All
agents, I, then securely share RI,J(x) with their neighbors J ∈ NI . Any agent I, thus has access
to functions that it has shared with neighbors, RI,J(x) for J ∈ NI , and functions that it has
received from neighbors, RK,I(x) for K such that I ∈ NK . This step is followed by obfuscation
of the private objective function using the arbitrarily generated functions RI,J(x). Every agent
transforms its objective function by adding all the arbitrary functions that it has received from its
neighbors and subtracting all the arbitrary functions transmitted to the neighbors, and arrives to
the obfuscated objective function fˆi(x),
fˆi(x) = fi(x) +
∑
K:I∈NK
RK,I(x)−
∑
J∈NI
RI,J(x) (3)
The objective obfuscation step is followed by iterative distributed projected gradient algorithm
similar to [23, 53]. The algorithm is formally presented as Algorithm 1. The interleaved consensus
and projected gradient algorithm involves two operations. The first operation in the algorithm is
to fuse information from the neighbors and build an estimate of average of the parameter vector.
A doubly stochastic matrices Bk, with the property that any entry Bk[I, J ] is greater than zero
if and only if I and J can communicate with each other, is used for information fusion. Also, we
assume that all non-zero entries are lower bounded by η, i.e. if Bk[I, J ] > 0 then Bk[I, J ] ≥ η for
some constant η > 0. We can write the fusion step as,
vJk =
∑
I∈NJ
Bk[J, I]x
I
k. (4)
The information aggregation step is followed by projected gradient step and it is formally written
as,
xJk+1 = PX
[
vJk − αk ∇fJ(vJk )
]
. (5)
where, PX is the projection operator onto set X (cf. [57]), and αk is the learning rate. Projected
gradient descent is a well known iterative gradient based method that guarantees convergence to
optimum under reducing learning rate (αk) [58]. We assume that the monotonically non-increasing
learning rate (step-size, αk) possesses the following properties,
αk > 0, ∀k ≥ 0; αk+1 ≤ αk, ∀k ≥ 0;
∞∑
k=0
αk =∞; and
∞∑
k=0
α2k <∞. (6)
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Algorithm 1 Privacy Preserving Distributed Optimization
1: Input: xJk , αk, NSteps . NSteps - Termination Criteria
2: Result: x∗ = argmin
x∈X
∑S
i=1 fi(x)
3: Every agent I shares function RI,J(x) with all neighboring agents J
4: Every agent I updates its objective function to fˆi(x) . Eq. 3
5: for k = 1 to NSteps do
6: for J = 1 to S do
7: vJk =
∑
I∈NJ Bk[J, I]x
I
k . Information Fusion
8: xJk+1 = PX
[
vJk − αk∇fˆJ(vJk )
]
. Projected Gradient Step
9: end for
10: end for
Remark 1 (Invariant Aggregate). Every arbitrary function RI,J(x) gets added to the objective
function of J and gets subtracted from the objective function of I. Then, it is easy to see that the
sum of obfuscated objective functions, fˆi(x), is the same as the sum of private objective functions,
fi(x), i.e. the aggregate f(x) is invariant under this transformation.
S∑
i=1
fˆi(x) =
S∑
i=1
fi(x) + ∑
K : I∈NK
RK,I(x)−
∑
J∈NI
RI,J(x)
 = S∑
i=1
fi(x) (7)
Remark 2 (Computational Complexity). Secure transmissions are computationally complex and
expensive. It is one of the major drawbacks of cryptographic approaches to privacy and secu-
rity [41]. Although, our algorithm involves a secure transmission, it is worth noting that this
exchange happens only once, at the start of the algorithm. The iterative consensus and projected
gradient steps (Lines 5 - 10 of Algorithm 1) belong to the category of standard iterative distributed
optimization algorithms that are known to be computationally inexpensive. Our algorithm does
not involve any additional computational overhead due to privacy.
3.1 Generating Arbitrary Functions RI,J(x)
We claim that using obfuscated functions fˆi(x) instead of original functions fi(x), the agents expose
only fˆi(x) and can hide the original objective functions. We will now build intuition for selecting
the arbitrarily generated functions RI,J(x). We know that any agent I has access to the following
quantities: Original objective function, fi(x), functions shared by agent I to neighbors, RI,J(x)
(controlled by agent I), and functions received by agent I from neighbors, RK,I(x) (controlled by
agent K). Clearly, if any agent I wishes to hide its objective functions, it needs to be smart in
generating RI,J(x).
Assumption 3. (F ,+) is an additive Abelian group.
For the purpose of discussion below, the admissible function set, F (Definition 1), is assumed
to satisfy the following axioms. These axioms (A1-A5) are called Abelian axioms; and set F and
operator “+” that satisfies the Abelian axioms, forms an algebraic structure called Additive Abelian
Group denoted by (F ,+). If the commutativity of the operator is not established, (F ,+) would
simply be an additive group [59] [60].
A1 (Additive Closure) The admissible function set F is closed under addition.
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A2 (Zero Element) There exists an element 0 ∈ F , such that, for any f ∈ F , f + 0 = f .
A3 (Inverse Element) For every element f ∈ F , there exists −f ∈ F such that, f + (−f) = 0.
A4 (Associativity) For all f1, f2, f3 ∈ F , (f1 + f2) + f3 = f1 + (f2 + f3) holds.
A5 (Commutativity) For all f1, f2 ∈ F , f1 + f2 = f2 + f1 holds.
Example 2 (Bounded Degree Polynomials). The set of all polynomials of degree less than or equal
to k is an admissible function set (if pm(x) denotes a m-degree polynomial in x, then F = {pm(x) =∑m
i=0 aix
i | m ≤ k}). Consider two polynomials in x of degree m and l (l < m ≤ k), denoted by
pm(x) =
∑m
i=0 aix
i and ql(x) =
∑l
i=0 bix
i where ai, bi ∈ R for all i. Note, pm(x)+qp(x) =
∑l
i=0(ai+
bi)x
i +
∑m
i=l+1 aix
i ∈ F and the closure axiom A1 is satisfied. The zero element corresponding to
qm is a polynomial with all coefficients (ai) being zero. The inverse element corresponding to pm
is a polynomial with ai = −bi. A4 and A5 are trivially satisfied for polynomials. Thus, (F ,+) is
an additive Abelian group.
Example 3 (Even Degree Polynomials). The set of polynomials with even degrees upper bounded
by k is an admissible function set, F = {pk =
∑bk/2c
i=0 a2ix
2i | a2i ∈ R}. Additive closure, associa-
tivity and commutativity can be easily proved. The zero element is just an even degree polynomial
with zero coefficients and inverse element is another polynomial with coefficients b2i = −a2i.
Using the definition and closure properties of the admissible set F (due to (F ,+) being an
additive Abelian group), we can clearly see that if functions RI,J(x) ∈ F , for all (I, J) pairs, then
fˆi(x) ∈ F . Another important consideration for selecting RI,J(x), comes from technical assumption
2. The arbitrary functions are so selected that the obfuscated functions satisfy Assumptions 2, i.e.
the obfuscated functions should have bounded gradients and must have Lipschitz gradients. It is
clear from the above arguments that the strategy of generating functions RI,J(x) is problem specific
and needs to be looked at on individually.
4 Convergence Analysis and Privacy Results
In this section, we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, present precise privacy claims and provide
proofs.
4.1 Convergence Analysis
Each of the obfuscated objective functions are possibly non-convex functions with a convex aggre-
gate (f(x) =
∑
i fi(x) =
∑
i fˆi(x) is convex, as noted in Remark 1). Convergence results developed
in [53] show that Algorithm 1 correctly minimizes convex aggregate of non-convex functions (and
hence accurately solves the optimization problem in (2)).
Theorem 1 (Theorem 5 and Claim 1, [53]). Agent iterates (xIk) and the iterate average (x¯k)
generated by Algorithm 1 (under Assumptions 1, 2 and strong connectivity of the communication
topology), asymptotically converge to an optimum in X ∗.
Proof: The proof follows as per the proof for Theorem 5 in [53]. 
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4.2 Privacy Guarantees
We first establish a connectivity condition on the underlying communication topology. Note that
we only need strong connectedness for convergence. The following conditions will be used to
characterize graph topologies for which privacy guarantees can be provided. We begin with the
definition of vertex connectivity and use it to define admissible topologies.
Definition 3 (Vertex Connectivity κ(G), [61]). The vertex connectivity of a connected graph
G is the minimum number of vertices whose deletion would increase the number of connected
components.
Definition 4 (f -admissible topology). A graph G is called f -admissible if its vertex connectivity
is greater than f , i.e. κ(G) > f .
We use a result from Whitney [62] that relates the vertex connectivity (κ(G)), the edge con-
nectivity (λ(G)) and the minimum degree of the graph (δ(G)). We will use this result to obtain a
inequality on the minimum degree of a f -admissible graph.
Theorem 2 (Whitney, [62]). For any arbitrary graph G, κ(G) ≤ λ(G) ≤ δ(G).
We know that for a f -admissible graph, κ(G) > f , along with the above result we get, δ(G) ≥
κ(G) > f implies δ(G) ≥ f + 1. This condition is necessary to ensure the privacy of individual
objective functions6. Topology being f -admissible is necessary and sufficient to ensure privacy of
additive objective functions of type fI(x) =
∑
i∈I fi(x), where I ⊂ V −A.
We now formally state the privacy guarantee for our privacy preserving distributed optimization
algorithm. As described in Section 2.1, strong PC adversarial coalition has access to parameter
vectors (from all agents) and the underlying graph topology. The problem is assumed to satisfy
Assumptions 1 and 2 for correctness of the algorithm.
Theorem 3. Let A denote a coalition of f PC adversaries among S agents. Let the underlying
communication topology be f -admissible then Algorithm 1 is a privacy preserving algorithm in the
sense of Definition 2.
Proof: We present a constructive method to show that given an execution (and corresponding
observations), any guess of objective functions (∈ FS , such that the sum of functions is f(x)) made
by the coalition is equally likely.
We conservatively assume that the adversary can observe the obfuscated functions, fˆi(x),
the private objective functions of the coalition members fA(x) (A ∈ A) and arbitrary functions
transmitted from and received by each of the coalition members, RA,J and RK,A (J ∈ NA and
K such that A ∈ NK , for all A ∈ A). Since the adversaries also follow the same protocol (Al-
gorithm 1), the coalition is also aware of the fact that the private objective functions have been
obfuscated by function sharing approach (Eq. 3).
fˆi(x) = fi(x) +
∑
K:I∈NK
RK,I(x)−
∑
J∈NI
RI,J(x)
Clearly, one can rewrite this transformation approach, using signed incidence matrix of bidirec-
tional graph G [61] [63].
fˆ = f + BR. (8)
6We will characterize a few failure scenarios (loss of privacy) including the one with presence of nodes that have
degree less than f + 1. This is, however, not the only loss of privacy scenario.
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where, fˆ =
[
fˆ1(x), fˆ1(x), . . . , fˆS(x)
]T
is a S × 1 vector of obfuscated functions fˆi(x) for i =
{1, 2, . . . , S}, and f = [f1(x), f1(x), . . . , fS(x)]T is a S × 1 vector of private (true) objective func-
tions, fi(x). B =
[
BC ,−BC
]
, where BC (of dimension S × |E|/2) is the incidence matrix of a
directed graph obtained by considering only one of the directions of every bidirectional edge in
graph G7. Each column of B represents a directed communication link between any two agents.
Hence, any bidirectional edge between agents I and J is represented as two directed links, I to J ,
(I, J) ∈ E and J to I (J, I) ∈ E and corresponds to two columns in B. R represents a |E|×1 vector
consisting of functions RI,J(x). Each entry in vector R, function RI,J(x) corresponds to a column
of B which, in turn corresponds to link (I, J) ∈ E ; and similarly, function RJ,I(x) corresponds to
a different column of B which, in turn corresponds to link (J, I) ∈ E . Note that `th row of column
vector R corresponds to `th column of incidence matrix B.
We will show that, two different sets of true objective functions (f and fo) and correspondingly
two different set of arbitrary functions (R and G), can lead to exactly same execution and obser-
vations for the adversaries8. We want to show that both these cases can result in same obfuscated
objective functions. That is,
fˆ = f + BR = fo + BG. (9)
We will show that given any set of private objective functions fo ∈ FS , suitably selecting
arbitrary functions GI,J(x) corresponding to links incident at “good” agents, it is possible to
make fo indistinguishable from original private objective functions f , solely based on the execution
observed by the adversaries. We do so by determining entries of G, which are arbitrary functions
that are dissimilar from RI,J(x) when I and J are both “good”. The design G such that the
obfuscated objective functions fˆ are the same for both situations.
Since adversaries observe arbitrary functions corresponding to edges incident to and from them,
we set the arbitrary functions corresponding to edges incident on adversaries as GK,A = RK,A and
arbitrary functions corresponding to edges incident away the adversary as GA,J = RA,J (where
K : A ∈ NK and J ∈ NA, for all A ∈ A). Now, we define G˜ as the vector containing all elements
of G except those corresponding to the edges incident to and from the adversaries9. Similarly,
we define B˜ to be the new incidence matrix obtained after deleting all edges that are incident on
the adversaries (i.e. deleting columns corresponding to the links incident on adversaries, from the
old incidence matrix B). We subtract GA,J(x) and GK,A(x) (∀ A ∈ A) by subtracting them from
[ˆf − fo] (in Eq. 9) to get effective function difference denoted by [ˆf − fo]eff as follows,
[ˆf − fo] = BG = f − fo + BR, . . . (From Eq. 9) (10)
[ˆf − fo]eff = [ˆf − fo]−
∑
A∈A
 ∑
K:A∈NK
GK,A(x)−
∑
J∈NA
GA,J(x)
 = B˜G˜, (11)
where, if d entries of G were fixed10 then G˜ is a (|E|−d)×1 vector and B˜ is a matrix with dimension
S × (|E| − d). The columns deleted from B correspond to the edges that are incident to and from
the adversaries. Hence, B˜ represents the incidence of a graph with these edges deleted.
7This represents an orientation of graph G [61].
8f and fo are dissimilar and arbitrarily different.
9The only entries of G, that are undecided at this stage are included in G˜. These are functions GI,J such that
I, J are both “good”.
10Total number of edges incident to and from adversaries is d. We fixed them to be the same as corresponding
entries from R, since the coalition can observe them.
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We know from the f -admissibility of the graph, that B˜ connects all the non-adversarial agents
into a connected component11. Since, the remaining edges form a connected component, the edges
can be split into two groups. A group with edges that form a spanning tree over the good nodes
(agents) and all other edges in the other group (see Remark 3 and Figure 2). Let B˜ST represent the
incidence matrix12 of the spanning tree and G˜ST represents the arbitrary functions corresponding
to the edges of the spanning tree. B˜EE represents the incidence matrix formed by all other edges
and G˜EE represents the arbitrary functions related to all other edges.
[ˆf − fo]eff =
[
B˜ST B˜EE
] [G˜ST
G˜EE
]
= B˜STG˜ST + B˜EEG˜EE. (12)
We now arbitrary assign functions to elements of G˜EE (as per Section 3.1) and then compute the
arbitrary weights for G˜ST. We know that the columns of B˜ST are linearly independent, since B˜ST
is the incidence matrix of a spanning tree (cf. Lemma 2.5 in [64]). Hence, the left pseudoinverse13
of B˜ST exists; and B˜
†
STB˜ST = I, giving us the solution for G˜ST
14.
G˜ST = B˜
†
ST
[
[ˆf − fo]eff − B˜EEG˜EE
]
. (13)
Using the construction shown above, for any fo we can construct G such that the execution
as seen by adversaries is exactly the same as the original problem where the objective is f and
the arbitrary functions are R. A strong PC coalition cannot distinguish between two executions
involving fo and f. Hence, no coalition can estimate fi(x) (i∈A). 
Remark 3 (Method for Constructing G). We present an example for the construction used in
the above proof. Let us consider a system of S = 7 agents communicating under a 2-admissible
topology (see Figure 2a). A coalition of two PC adversaries (A = {6, 7}, f = 2) is a part of the
system. We can divide the task of constructing G into three steps -
1. Fix GA,l and Gl,A (links incident on adversaries) to be the corresponding entries in R,
2. Arbitrarily select the functions corresponding to non spanning tree edges (G˜EE), and
3. Solve for the functions corresponding to the spanning tree (G˜ST) using Eq. 13.
We first, follow the Step 1 and fix GK,A = RK,A and GA,J = RA,J (where K : A ∈ NK and
J ∈ NA, for all A ∈ A). Step 1 follows form the fact that the adversaries observe RA,J and RK,A,
and hence they need to be same in both executions. This is followed by substituting the known
entries in G and subtract them from the left hand side as shown in Eq. 11. This corresponds to
the deletion of all incoming and outgoing edges from the adversaries. The incidence matrix of this
new graph is denoted by B˜. The edges in the new graph can be decomposed into two groups - a set
containing edges that form a spanning tree and a set that contains all other edges. This is seen in
Figure 2c where the red edges are all the remaining links (incidence matrix, B˜EE); and Figure 2d
where the green edges form a spanning tree (incidence matrix, B˜ST) with Agent 1 as the root and
all other “good” agents as its leaves (agents 2, 3, 4, 5). We now arbitrarily select G˜EE (Step-2)
followed by solving for G˜ST using Eq. 13 (Step-3). This completes construction of G.
11The adversarial nodes become disconnected due to the deletion of edges incident on adversaries (previous step).
12Its columns correspond to the edges that form spanning tree.
13A† represents the pseudoinverse of matrix A.
14An alternate way to look at this would be to see that B˜TSTB˜ST represents the edge Laplacian [65] of the spanning
tree. The edge Laplacian of an acyclic graph is non-singular and this also proves that left-pseudoinverse of B˜ST exists.
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(b) Step-1. Fix GA,l and Gl,A.
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(c) Step-2. Arbitrarily select GEE.
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(d) Step-3. Solve for GST (Eq. 13).
Figure 2: An example of construction used for proving Theorem 3. Network has S = 7 nodes and
a coalition with f = 2 adversaries. The graph topology is 2-admissible.
Example 4. The privacy preserving optimization algorithm completely obfuscates the true objec-
tive functions fi(x) (topology as shown in Figure 1a). We can have, for arbitrarily large number
of problems, executions that are exactly same. For instance consider three agents with one adver-
sary (Agent 1). We show that for two different sets of objective functions {f1(x), f2(x), f3(x)}
and {h1(x), h2(x), h3(x)} 15, there exists two sets of arbitrarily functions, RI,J(x), such that
fˆ1(x) = hˆ1(x), fˆ2(x) = hˆ2(x) and fˆ3(x) = hˆ3(x), while the adversaries observe the same ex-
ecution. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the objective functions for two distributed optimization
problems. Now we consider two sets of arbitrarily functions, RI,J(x), as seen in Column 2. Ob-
serve that the obfuscated objective functions for both problems are exactly the same (Column
3), giving rise to identical executions (iterations) and the quantities observed by the adversary
(f1(x), fˆ1(x), fˆ2(x), fˆ3(x), R1,2(x), R1,3(x), R2,1(x) and R3,1(x)) are the same for both problems.
This results in the inability of the adversary to distinguish between the two different optimization
problems.
15The two problems are restricted to have,
∑3
i=1 fi(x) =
∑3
i=1 hi(x) = f(x).
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Problem 1
fi(x) RI,J(x) fˆi(x)
f1(x) = x
2 R1,2(x) = 3x+ 9x
2 + x3 + 2x4
fˆ1(x) = −3x− 4x2 − 4x3 + 2x4R1,3(x) = 5x+ 1x2 + 7x3 + 6x4
f2(x) = x
2 + x4
R2,1(x) = 5x
2 + 3x3 + 6x4
fˆ2(x) = 10x+ 4x
2 − 7x3 − 4x4
R2,3(x) = 4x
2 + 5x3 + 7x4
f3(x) = x
4 R3,1(x) = 5x+ 1x
3 + 4x4
fˆ3(x) = −7x+ 2x2 + 11x3 + 4x4R3,2(x) = 7x+ 3x2 + 6x4
Problem 2
fi(x) RI,J(x) fˆi(x)
h1(x) = x
2 R1,2(x) = 3x+ 9x
2 + x3 + 2x4
hˆ1(x) = −3x− 4x2 − 4x3 + 2x4R1,3(x) = 5x+ 1x2 + 7x3 + 6x4
h2(x) = 3x
2 + 3x4
R2,1(x) = 5x
2 + 3x3 + 6x4
hˆ2(x) = 10x+ 4x
2 − 7x3 − 4x4
R2,3(x) = −17x+ 10x2 + 12x3 + 13x4
h3(x) = −2x2 − x4 R3,1(x) = 5x+ 1x
3 + 4x4
hˆ3(x) = −7x+ 2x2 + 11x3 + 4x4R3,2(x) = −10x+ 7x2 + 7x3 + 10x4
Table 2: Table describes two distributed optimization problems that will have identical executions.
Theorem 3 states that none of the private objective functions can be meaningfully recovered
(Definition 2). However, we can further talk about the privacy of the overall aggregate function,
f(x), and the aggregate of objective functions belonging to “good” agents, fA′ , under relaxed
requirements (like allowing ambiguity in the constant term). We also allow the coalition to run
numerical schemes like polynomial regression on observed quantities. With these added assumptions
we can claim that a coalition may uncover (not necessarily) the overall aggregate and the aggregate
of objective functions private to “good” agents.
Remark 4 (Privacy of f(x)). The invariance of aggregate is described in Remark 1. Clearly,
if the coalition can extract fˆi(x) via a numerical scheme (like polynomial regression) albeit with
ambiguity in the constant term, then by simply adding all fˆi(x) together, the coalition can estimate
f(x) with uncertainty in the constant term.
Remark 5 (Privacy of fA′(x)). We know from Remark 4 that the coalition can estimate f(x) and
the coalition already has access to the objective functions of the adversaries. Hence, the coalition
can estimate fA′(x) using the relation fA′(x) =
∑
i∈A fi(x) = f(x) −
∑
i∈A fi(x). The coalition
can estimate fA′(x) with ambiguity in constant term.
4.3 Loss of Privacy
Theorem 3 clearly characterizes the conditions on communication topology for privacy preservation.
The f -admissibility condition is both necessary and sufficient for privacy of Algorithm 1. In this
section we characterize certain topologies that (do not satisfy f -admissibility condition) and are
prone to specific types of attacks.
• Loss of individual privacy - If the degree of one or more nodes is less than f+1, then those agents
are susceptible to privacy loss and a coalition may uncover their objective functions. Figure 3a
shows a system of five agents (S = 5) with one adversary (A = {3}, f = 1) and its communication
topology is not 1-admissible. Agent 4 has a degree deficiency. Since the adversary can observe
all the arbitrary functions (R3,4, R4,3) used by Agent 4 for obfuscating its objective function, the
objective function of Agent 4 (f4(x)) is vulnerable to privacy loss from the adversary.
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• Loss of group privacy - If the vertex is only (f−1)-admissible and the coalition is a of size f , then
there exists cases where the coalition can effectively uncover sum of objective functions of a set of
agents (group). Figure 3b shows a system with six agents (S = 6) with one adversary (A = {3},
f = 1) under a 0-admissible topology. The objective function sums, f{1,2}(x) = f1(x) + f2(x)
and f{4,5,6}(x) = f4(x) + f5(x) + f6(x) are susceptible to privacy loss from the adversary.
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Figure 3: Loss of privacy - failure scenarios. The adversary is shown in red with concentric circles.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we show that the privacy preserving optimization algorithm in Section 3 solves the
learning problem correctly. We consider a network of S = 3 connected agents as shown in Figure 1a.
Each agent is endowed with a private objective function, given by f1(x) = x
2, f2(x) = x
2 + x4 and
f3(x) = x
4. The system tries to optimize the additive aggregate, f(x) = f1(x) + f2(x) + f3(x) =
2(x2+x4). The aggregate function f(x) achieves optimum (minimum) at x∗ = 0. Agents implement
the privacy preserving distributed optimization protocol presented as Algorithm 1. The agents
share their states (model parameters) with neighbors. States received from other agents are fused
using a doubly-stochastic matrix Bk. The learning step is given by a monotonically decreasing,
non-summable but square summable sequence, αk = 1/(k + 0.0001).
Bk =
 0.5 0.25 0.250.25 0.5 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.5
 .
We consider arbitrarily generated function RI,J(x) in Table 2 (Problem 1). The obfuscated
objective functions are given by (Column 3),
fˆ1(x) = f1(x) +R2,1(x) +R3,1(x)−R1,2(x)−R1,3(x) = −3x− 4x2 − 4x3 + 2x4,
fˆ2(x) = f2(x) +R1,2(x) +R3,2(x)−R2,1(x)−R2,3(x) = 10x+ 1x2 − 4x3 − 4x4, and
fˆ3(x) = f3(x) +R1,3(x) +R2,3(x)−R3,1(x)−R3,2(x) = −7x+ 5x2 + 8x3 + 4x4.
It can be easily verified that the aggregate function is an invariant (Remark 1), f(x) =
∑
fi(x) =∑
fˆi(x) = 2(x
2 + x4). Note, that transformed problem falls under the “distributed optimization of
a convex aggregate of non-convex functions” framework, presented in [53]. Figure 4a, 4b, and 4c
shows the effect of obfuscation using arbitrary random functions RI,J(x) on the private objective
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Figure 4: Objective Function and Obfuscated Objective Functions.
function fi(x). As seen in Figure 4, the private objective function and obfuscated functions are
different from each other.
The iterate-average (x¯k = (x
1
k+x
2
k+x
3
k)/3) is plotted in Figure 5a. The iterate average converges
to the optimal point of f(x). Figure 5b plots the maximum deviation (max δk = maxJ ‖xJk − x¯k‖)
of an iterate from the iterate average. The reduction in maximum deviation shows that all the
agents converge to the iterate average. Figure 5c plots the iterates of each agent with respect to the
iteration count. Figure 5d decrease in the RMS error (η2k =
[
(x1k − x¯k)2 + (x2k − x¯k)2 + (x3k − x¯k)2
]
).
Note that the observed gradient is drastically different from the true gradient. This ensures
that even a strong PC adversary can estimate only the obfuscated function. The private objective
function remains hidden and an adversary cannot uncover any private objective function.
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Figure 5: Correctness and Convergence of Privacy Preserving Algorithm 1.
6 Conclusion
In this report, we present a privacy preserving algorithm for distributed optimization over net-
works. We show that a secure function sharing approach can be used to obfuscate private objective
functions and protect them from adversarial estimation. We define privacy of individual objective
functions, in the context of distributed optimization problems, as the inability of an adversary
to reduce ambiguity between any arbitrarily guessed (feasible) candidate function. We use vertex
connectivity (> f) to characterize graphs that allow Algorithm 1 to be privacy preserving against
a coalition of f adversaries, in the sense that any arbitrary guess of the objective functions made
by the coalition is equally consistent. We prove that the function sharing strategy for privacy
preserving distributed optimization preserves privacy under an f -admissible graph topology and
show correctness, convergence and privacy claims through an example and simulations.
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